主权违约
经济
债务
货币经济学
政府(语言学)
规范性
违约
政府债务
违约风险
财政政策
信用风险
宏观经济学
财务
主权债务
法学
主权
哲学
认识论
政治
语言学
政治学
作者
Demian Pouzo,Ignacio Presno
出处
期刊:American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
[American Economic Association]
日期:2016-05-01
卷期号:14 (3): 1-41
摘要
How are the optimal tax and debt policies affected if the government can default on its debt? We address this question from a normative perspective in an economy with noncontingent government debt, domestic default, and labor taxes. On one hand, default prevents the government from incurring future tax distortions associated with servicing the debt. On the other hand, default risk gives rise to endogenous credit limits that hinder the government's ability to smooth taxes. We characterize the fiscal policy and show how the option to default alters the near–unit root component of taxes in the economy with risk-free borrowing. (JEL D52, E62, H21, H24, H63)
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