监督人
独创性
心理学
价值(数学)
社会心理学
政治
计算机科学
管理
政治学
经济
创造力
机器学习
法学
作者
Florian Offergelt,Laura Venz
出处
期刊:Journal of Knowledge Management
[Emerald (MCB UP)]
日期:2022-06-29
卷期号:27 (5): 1209-1227
被引量:8
标识
DOI:10.1108/jkm-08-2021-0655
摘要
Purpose Knowledge hiding, intentionally withholding work-relevant information, is detrimental to organizations, yet practiced by supervisors and employees. Based on social learning and social exchange theories, this study aims to uncover the effects of supervisor knowledge hiding, abusive supervision and employee political skill on employee knowledge hiding behaviors, namely, evasive hiding, playing dumb and rationalized hiding. We compare the two destructive supervisor behaviors in their predictive values toward employee knowledge hiding and examine the role of employee political skill in mitigating their effects. Design/methodology/approach Based on survey data collected from 598 German-speaking employees, we used path analysis to test the hypotheses. Findings The two destructive supervisor behaviors and employee political skill predicted employee evasive hiding and playing dumb; supervisor knowledge hiding additionally predicted employee rationalized hiding. The predictive value of supervisor knowledge hiding was 2.5 times larger than that of abusive supervision and political skill. The effects of destructive supervisor behaviors were weaker for more politically skilled employees. Originality/value We examine two destructive supervisor behaviors conjointly and show the differences between them regarding their predictive value toward employee knowledge hiding. Furthermore, we investigate the role of political skill in knowledge hiding.
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