业务
供应链
服务(商务)
微观经济学
收入分享
收入
产业组织
社会福利
渠道协调
付款
频道(广播)
议价能力
供应链管理
营销
经济
财务
计算机科学
计算机网络
政治学
法学
作者
Yunzhi Liu,Tiaojun Xiao,Zhi‐Ping Fan,Xuan Zhao
出处
期刊:Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
[American Institute of Mathematical Sciences]
日期:2024-01-01
卷期号:20 (1): 112-143
被引量:2
摘要
Some special events such as adjustments of executives can cause the disruption of social welfare responsibility degree (SWRD for short) of firm's decision-maker, which may further influence the price and service-level decisions and supply chain coordination.However, in the field of supply chain management, there are very limited studies on SWRD disruption.Facing potential SWRD disruption, we develop game-theoretic models to investigate the price and service-level decisions and channel coordination in manufacturer-led and retailer-led supply chains.We find that: (1) if SWRD changes greatly, then a higher SWRD decreases retail price and raises service level; otherwise, these decisions are robust to its disruption; (2) after SWRD disruption, while the manufacturer-led supply chain can be coordinated by all-unit wholesale quantity discount contract with fixed service level and capacitated linear pricing contract with fixed service level, the retailer-led supply chain can be coordinated by revenue-responsibility-cost-sharing contract with extra side payment; and win-win situation for channel members can be achieved under coordination mechanisms; and (3) numerical results imply that the change in channel power structure may invert the effects of SWRD disruption on channel members' profits; and a higher SWRD may increase the win-win opportunity (cooperation) for channel members under coordination mechanisms.Moreover, with the consideration of extra demand disruptions caused by SWRD disruption, we surprisingly observe that if SWRD changes greatly, then a higher SWRD may raise retail price and service level; otherwise, only service level is robust to its disruption.
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