组合博弈论
简单(哲学)
博弈论
价值(数学)
游戏中的回合、回合和计时系统
班级(哲学)
重复博弈
基础(证据)
领域(数学)
博弈机制
数理经济学
数学
计算机科学
电子游戏设计
认识论
人工智能
地理
哲学
考古
机器学习
纯数学
出处
期刊:Cambridge University Press eBooks
[Cambridge University Press]
日期:1988-10-28
卷期号:: 31-40
被引量:5244
标识
DOI:10.1017/cbo9780511528446.003
摘要
At the foundation of the theory of games is the assumption that the players of a game can evaluate, in their utility scales, every “prospect” that might arise as a result of a play. In attempting to apply the theory to any field, one would normally expect to be permitted to include, in the class of “prospects,” the prospect of having to play a game. The possibility of evaluating games is therefore of critical importance. So long as the theory is unable to assign values to the games typically found in application, only relatively simple situations—where games do not depend on other games—will be susceptible to analysis and solution.
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