业务
公司治理
中国
高管薪酬
控制(管理)
自愿披露
会计
盈余管理
面板数据
收益
财务
经济
政治学
法学
管理
计量经济学
作者
Dingzu Zhang,Lijuan Pan,Luqi Liu,Huixiang Zeng
摘要
Abstract This study investigates the mechanisms through which the executive pay gap affects the disclosure of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information. Utilizing panel data from China's A‐share listed firms between 2012 and 2020, our findings reveal a significant positive correlation between the executive pay gap and ESG disclosure, with real earnings management playing a partial mediating role. Notably, the impact of the executive pay gap on ESG disclosure is more pronounced in voluntary disclosure firms and those with low internal control levels, as compared to mandatory disclosure firms and those with high internal control levels. This study provides international evidence for the strategic disclosure behavior of ESG information and the necessity of ESG disclosure regulation.
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