激励
目标理论
内在动机
自决论
员工激励
感知
情感(语言学)
执行
心理学
员工敬业度
认知评价理论
心理干预
拥挤
论证(复杂分析)
社会心理学
公共关系
认知心理学
微观经济学
经济
政治学
神经科学
化学
法学
精神科
自治
生物化学
沟通
作者
Maria Falk Mikkelsen,Christian Bøtcher Jacobsen,Lotte Bøgh Andersen
标识
DOI:10.1080/10967494.2015.1043166
摘要
A number of studies show that the use of external interventions such as command systems and economic incentives can decrease employee intrinsic motivation. Our knowledge of why the size of "the hidden cost of rewards" differs among organizations is, however, still sparse. In this article, we analyze whether local managers—the primary enforcers of external interventions—affect how employees perceive a command system and thereby affect employee intrinsic motivation. Using a multilevel dataset of 1,190 teachers and 32 school principals, we test whether principals' use of "hard," "mixed," or "soft" actions to enforce a command system (obligatory teacher-produced student plans) is associated with teacher intrinsic motivation. Results show that teachers experiencing "hard" enforcement actions have lower intrinsic motivation than teachers experiencing "soft" enforcement actions. As expected by motivation crowding theory, part of this association is mediated by teachers' student plan requirement perception. These findings support the motivation crowding argument that employee intrinsic motivation depend on the employees' need for self-determination.
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