政府(语言学)
补贴
明星(博弈论)
审计
首都(建筑)
管理
执行董事
资本支出
业务
公共关系
会计
政治学
经济
法学
历史
数学分析
语言学
数学
考古
哲学
作者
Conggang Li,Rong Xu,Yifan Zhou
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102452
摘要
This paper examines the benefits of having an executive or director elected as a fellow of the Chinese Academies of Sciences and Engineering (i.e., a star academician). Evidence indicates that markets react positively to news of company executives/directors being elected. We further document that having a fellow spurs innovation, brings additional government subsidy, increases Tobin's q, lowers costs of capital, attracts analyst attention, and suppresses audit fees in the years following successful elections. These outcomes appear to be largely driven by fellows who (i) are executives rather than non-executive directors, and (ii) have held no government office.
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