Can Mixed-Ownership Reform of State-Owned Enterprises Restrain Excessive Perquisite Consumption by Executives?

This article uses China's listed SOEs from 2013–2020 as samples and conducts empirical analysis on the relationship between the mixed-ownership Mixed ownership reform and excessive perquisite consumption by executives. Findings of this study show that SOE mixed-ownership reforms can significantly restrains excessive perquisite consumption by executives. Nevertheless, simply changing the diversity of share ownership does not significantly affect excessive perquisite consumption. Testing mediation found that improving internal control quality is one channel for restraining excessive perquisite consumption by executives. According to the heterogeneity test, it is found that in the local SOEs group and the group of executives with less power, the mixed-ownership Mixed ownership reform has a more significant restraining effect on excessive perquisite consumption by executives. This study supplements the literature on the economic implications of mixed-ownership Mixed ownership reform, and it also provides a definite policy reference for Mixed ownership reform.