Manufacturing consensus: China’s strategic narratives and geoeconomic competition in Asia

China’s attempt to build geopolitical influence through economic instruments has become a critical facet of US-China competition. How can rising powers convince follower states to join alternative (geoeconomic) initiatives created and/or led by the rising powers, in the shadow of potential rebuke from the hegemon? This article theorizes how rising powers can use strategic narratives to ameliorate the follower states’ concerns of antagonizing the hegemon for aligning with alternative initiatives. We argue that rising powers can control the narrative through “two-front narration”: simultaneously telling the hegemon that they seek limited changes, while telling follower states that they do not have to worry about crossfire because the rising powers-hegemon relations are non-zero-sum. By sending the right messages to different audiences to induce motivated reasoning, rising powers can manufacture the appearance of consensus among multiple audiences to help follower states hedge, while blunting the formation of containment coalitions. We adopt a mixed-methods approach to substantiate our theory: (1) text analysis of China’s messaging about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) from 2008 to 2016; (2) case study of the rhetorical action-reactions between China, the United States, and the follower states on the relationship between the TPP and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; and (3) parallel case study of the rhetorical action-reactions between China, the United States, and the follower states on the relationship between the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and multilateral development banks such as the World Bank. Our analysis has implications for theories of strategic narratives in international politics and debates about geoeconomic competition/hedging in Asia.