召回
心理学
促进
假新闻
社会心理学
干涉理论
认知心理学
计算机科学
认知
互联网隐私
工作记忆
神经科学
作者
Paige L. Kemp,Alyssa H. Sinclair,R. Alison Adcock,Christopher N. Wahlheim
标识
DOI:10.1186/s41235-024-00546-w
摘要
Abstract Fake news can have enduring effects on memory and beliefs. An ongoing theoretical debate has investigated whether corrections (fact-checks) should include reminders of fake news. The familiarity backfire account proposes that reminders hinder correction (increasing interference), whereas integration-based accounts argue that reminders facilitate correction (promoting memory integration). In three experiments, we examined how different types of corrections influenced memory for and belief in news headlines. In the exposure phase, participants viewed real and fake news headlines. In the correction phase, participants viewed reminders of fake news that either reiterated the false details (complete) or prompted recall of missing false details (partial); reminders were followed by fact-checked headlines correcting the false details. Both reminder types led to proactive interference in memory for corrected details, but complete reminders produced less interference than partial reminders (Experiment 1). However, when participants had fewer initial exposures to fake news and experienced a delay between exposure and correction, this effect was reversed; partial reminders led to proactive facilitation, enhancing correction (Experiment 2). This effect occurred regardless of the delay before correction (Experiment 3), suggesting that the effects of partial reminders depend on the number of prior fake news exposures. In all experiments, memory and perceived accuracy were better when fake news and corrections were recollected, implicating a critical role for integrative encoding. Overall, we show that when memories of fake news are weak or less accessible, partial reminders are more effective for correction; when memories of fake news are stronger or more accessible, complete reminders are preferable.
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