Extension of generalized solidarity values to interval-valued cooperative games

The main purpose of this paper is to extend the concept of generalized solidarity values to interval-valued cooperative games and hereby develop a simplified and fast approach for solving a subclass of interval-valued cooperative games. In this paper, we find some weaker coalition monotonicity-like conditions so that the generalized solidarity values of the $ \alpha $-cooperative games associated with interval-valued cooperative games are always monotonic and non-decreasing functions of any parameter $ \alpha \in [0,1] $. Thereby the interval-valued generalized solidarity values can be directly and explicitly obtained by computing their lower and upper bounds through only using the lower and upper bounds of the interval-valued coalitions' values, respectively. The developed method does not use the interval subtraction and hereby can effectively avoid the issues resulted from it. Furthermore, we discuss the effect of the parameter $ \xi $ on the interval-valued generalized solidarity values of interval-valued cooperative games and some significant properties of interval-valued generalized solidarity values.