再制造
补贴
计算机科学
供应链
电池(电)
环境经济学
不间断电源
利润(经济学)
业务
利润最大化
最大化
数据库事务
汽车工程
功率(物理)
微观经济学
制造工程
经济
物理
工程类
营销
程序设计语言
量子力学
市场经济
作者
Ziao Zhang,Yanmin Wang,Yan Guo,Hanwen Song
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.procs.2023.08.102
摘要
The ideal closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) for power battery recycling is "production - transaction - recycling - echelon utilization - remanufacturing". For the purpose of boosting the utilization efficiency of power battery, this paper constructs two models on the echelon utilization of power battery to influence of the government subsidies to the power battery manufacturer or the recycler on CLSC. We focus on exploring the influence of the retailer's green investment in logistics and the sharing costs of manufacturer on the equilibrium results and profits of CLSC. The results show that when the power battery manufacturer's sharing coefficient is maintained in a low range, the investment level of green logistics can be promoted and the profit maximization of the CLSC can be achieved, which has a positive effect on the establishment of a good corporate image and the increase of demand. Furthermore, the power battery manufacturer ought to choose reasonable sharing coefficient to the positive effect of cost sharing on CLSC. In addition to increasing the number of used batteries to be recycled, government subsidies can also enhance the recycled efficiency of power batteries.
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