补贴
激励
政府(语言学)
业务
冷链
投资(军事)
财务
点(几何)
产业组织
经济
微观经济学
市场经济
语言学
法学
化学
哲学
政治
数学
食品科学
政治学
几何学
作者
Rong Wu,Lin Zhu,Wei Ma
出处
期刊:Heliyon
[Elsevier]
日期:2024-04-30
卷期号:10 (9): e30559-e30559
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e30559
摘要
To solve the problem of insufficient low-carbon operational motivation among cold chain logistics enterprises due to the high investment costs of low-carbon assets and considering the promotional effect of environmental regulatory policies and green credit, an evolutionary game model was constructed for the government, cold chain logistics enterprises, and financial institutions. The stability strategies of each participating entity and the stability of the system equilibrium point were analyzed, and the relevant conclusions were verified through numerical simulations. The research results indicated the following: 1) the initial willingness of the three parties to participate increased, the low-carbon operation of cold chain logistics enterprises and the speed of green credit services provided by financial institutions accelerated, and the rate of strict government regulation slowed down. 2) Moderate subsidies and taxes were conducive to the joint participation of the three parties. 3) Increasing the subsidy for green credit provided positive incentives for financial institutions to provide green credit services, while reducing credit interest rates accelerated the low-carbon operation rate of cold chain logistics enterprises.
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