Takeover Protections and Asset Prices

We study the effects of takeover feasibility on asset prices and returns in a unified framework. We show theoretically that takeover protections increase equity risk, stock returns, and bond yields by removing a valuable put option to sell the firm, notably for firms approaching distress. We investigate these claims empirically and find that distressed firms experience a significant decrease in value and increase in returns and market betas after the passage of antitakeover laws, in line with our predictions. At issue bond yields are also higher when an antitakeover law is in effect. Consistent with the model, the effects of antitakeover laws on stock returns, respectively, bond yields, are greater when shareholders, respectively, bondholders, have greater bargaining power. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Funding: E. Morellec acknowledges financial support from the Swiss Finance Institute. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03111 .