China’s Minimalist Global Military Posture: Great Power Lite?

ABSTRACTWhat explains the mismatch between China’s vast economic presence, significant diplomatic engagement around the world, and its miniscule global military posture? China’s global defense footprint – as measured by overseas deployments and basing – is extremely modest compared to that of many other great powers. While military activity and the construction of military installations in the Asia-Pacific have both expanded noticeably in recent decades, China appears far more reticent to project or station armed forces beyond its immediate neighborhood. Domestic normative factors can explain Chinese hesitancy to increase its global military posture while geostrategic factors can explain the elevated regional activity and clustering of new bases around China’s periphery. Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. 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Center for Strategic and International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China Island Tracker, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/.25. Indeed one scholar argues that Chinese leaders have become far too ambitious resulting in “overreach.” See Susan L. Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023).26. See, for example, Andrew J. Nathan, “What Exactly is America’s China Policy?” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/us-china-biden-strategy-geopolitics/.27. The most thorough and carefully researched treatment is: Doshi, The Long Game. Other studies include: Ian Easton, The Final Struggle: Inside China’s Grand Strategy (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2022); Timothy Heath, Derek Grossman, and Aisha Clark, China’s Quest for Global Primacy: An Analysis of China’s International and Defense Strategies to Outcompete the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).28. 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Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1975); Melvin Gurtov and Byung-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Gerald Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Mark. A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, Michael A. McDevitt, eds. Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); Scobell, China’s Use.For noteworthy studies of China’s crisis behavior, see Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006): Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); Kai He, China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge, 2016).33. For noteworthy studies of China and UNPKO, see Bates Gill and Huang Ching-Hao, China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009); Dennis J. Blasko, “China’s Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations: Understanding the Numbers,” China Brief 16, no. 18 (December 5, 2016); Joel Wuthnow, “PLA Operational Lessons from UN Peacekeeping,” in The PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context, ed. Wuthnow et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2021), 235–65.34. For noteworthy studies of China’s naval operations, see Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010); Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 2013); Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, Six Years at Sea … and Counting: Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and China’s Maritime Commons Presence (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2015).35. For noteworthy studies of Chinese humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Noncombatant Operations in China,” Asian Security 7, no. 3 (2011):177–200; Matthew Southerland, The Chinese Military’s Role in Overseas Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Contributions and Concerns, Staff Research Report (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 11, 2019).36. For noteworthy studies of China’s power projection capabilities, see Cristina L. Garofola and Timothy R. Heath, The Chinese Air Force’s First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017); Timothy R. Heath, Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 21, 2016; Kristen Gunness and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “A Global People’s Liberation Army: Possibilities, Challenges, and Opportunities,” Asia Policy 22 (July 2016):135–56; Kirsten Gunness, “The PLA’s Expeditionary Force: Current Capabilities and Future Trends,” in The PLA Beyond Borders, ed. Wuthnow et al. 23–50 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2021).37. For noteworthy studies of China’s overseas basing and access activities, see Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, “Not an Idea We have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2014); Leah Dreyfuss and Mara Karlin, All That Xi Wants: China Attempts to Ace Bases Overseas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 2019); Peter A. Dutton, Isaac A. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy, Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 2020); Isaac B. Kardon, “China’s Overseas Bases, Places, and Far Sea Logistics,” in The PLA Beyond Borders, ed. Wuthnow et al, 73–106 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2021); Cristina L. Garafola et al., The People’s Liberation Army’s Search for Overseas Basing and Access (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022); Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert, “Pier Competitor: China’s Power Position in Global Ports,” International Security 46, no. 4 (Spring 2022):9–47.38. Robert Burns, “Pentagon Rethinks how to Array Forces to Focus on China,” Associated Press, February 17, 2021.39. Burns, “Pentagon Rethinks.”40. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today. 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 22.41. As Robert E. Harkavy observes: “a host of definitional and sematic problems surround … [basing].” See his Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200–2000 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 5–6 (quote on 5).42. Although the PRC was formally proclaimed on October 1, 1949, Beijing had yet to take control of large areas of the country, including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hainan Island. By October 1950, Beijing had extended control over those areas but not intervened in Korea.43. See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2011) and Doshi, The Long Game.44. Andrew Scobell, Edmund J. Burke, Cortez A. Cooper, III, Sale Lilly, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Eric Warner, and J. D. Williams, China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, Long-Term Competition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).45. 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According to one scholar: no “crisis in a third country had … [ever] impacted Chinese interests abroad as much as … [Libya 2011].” Ghiselli, Protecting China’s Interests, 1.134. For an account of the 2016 session, see Edward Schwarck, “UK-China Cooperate on Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (October/November 2016): 36–45.135. “Wolf Warrior 2 Promotes How China will Always Protect its Nationals,” China Daily, August 2, 2017.136. Andrew Scobell and Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Overstretched Military,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Fall 2012):135–48.137. See Kimberly Jackson, Andrew Scobell, Stephen Webber, and Logan Ma, Command and Control in U.S. Naval Competition with China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), 31.138. Jackson et al., Command and Control, 24–25, 39.139. China’s National Defense in the New Era, Section IV.140. Jackson et al., Command and Control, 32.141. See David Shambaugh, “The Political Work System in the PLA,” China Quarterly no. 127 (September 1991): 527–68.142. Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “Introduction,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, ed. Saunders et al, 14–15 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019).143. Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Impact of Xi Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, ed. Saunders et al., 136 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019).144. Jackson et al., Command and Control, 40.145. Phillip C. Saunders, Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University, July 2020), 8.146. Guo Yuandan and Ju Zhenhua, “Zhonguo haijun yuanhai xunlian zao waijun zhijin zhencha bei hangxing yukuai” [While under close reconnaissance by foreign forces the Chinese navy was wished a bon voyage] Global Times, August 4, 2015.147. Liu Yaxun, Wang Junshuo, and Chen Guoquan, “Yuanhai dayang lijian chuqiao” [Far sea ocean sharp sword unsheathed] China Military Net, July 24, 2017.148. Guo and Ju, “Zhongguo haijun.”149. Jackson et al., Command and Control, 44.150. Dreyfuss and Karlin, All That, 1.151. Sun Degang, “China’s Military Relations with the Middle East,” in The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East, ed. James Reardon-Anderson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 84.152. Sun, “China’s Military Relations,” 85.153. Dreyfuss and Karlin, All That, 1.154. The original quote referred to the Middle East; yet it also seems applicable to China’s global presence with one tweak: upgrading Beijing’s diplomatic weight class. Scobell and Nader, China in the Middle East, 76.155. Shih, “Central Asia’s Forbidding.”156. Scobell and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “The Flag,” 187–88.157. Integrated Joint Operations is a key PLA operational concept: Edmund J. Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez A. Cooper III, and Mark Cozad, People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), 6.158. Evan A. Fagenbaum and Charles Hooper, “What the Chinese Army Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 21, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/21/what-chinese-army-is-learning-from-russia-s-ukraine-war-pub-87552.159. Emanuele Scimia, “A Weakened Russia Leaves China with Security Gaps in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” South China Morning Post, October 10, 2022.160. Harkavy, Strategic Basing, 1–28.161. Kardon and Leutert, “Pier Competitor.”162. Doshi, The Long Game, 296.163. See, for example, Scobell et al., China’s Grand Strategy.164. The term “soft footprint” is used to describe China’s military presence in the Middle East. See Sun, “China’s Military.”Additional informationNotes on contributorsAndrew ScobellAndrew Scobell is Distinguished Fellow in the China Program at the United States Institute of Peace and Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University both located in Washington, DC.