数据泄露
股东
业务
论证(复杂分析)
诉讼风险分析
衡平法
官员
身份盗窃
法学
公司治理
财务
会计
法律与经济学
经济
计算机安全
生物化学
计算机科学
化学
审计
政治学
作者
Musaib Ashraf,Jayanthi Sunder
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2020-0787
摘要
ABSTRACT Data breach disclosure laws are state-level disclosure mandates intended to protect individuals from the consequences of identity theft. However, we argue that the laws help reduce shareholder risk by encouraging managers to take real actions to reduce firms’ exposure to cyber risk. Consistent with this argument, we find an on-average decrease in shareholder risk, proxied by cost of equity, after the staggered passage of these laws. We also find the effect is attenuated for firms that already took real actions to manage cyber risk before the laws. Further, after these laws, firms are more likely to increase cybersecurity investments and have a cybersecurity officer. Finally, we observe positive abnormal returns on key dates related to the passage of these laws. Our collective evidence suggests that consumer protection disclosure mandates can benefit shareholders and, specifically, that regulators can use disclosure mandates to incentivize managers to reduce firms’ exposure to cyber risk. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available. JEL Classifications: G120; G340.
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