Substantial innovation or strategic innovation: An evolutionary game analysis of companies' green technology innovation strategies under carbon emission trading market

Abstract Although both the carbon emission trading market (CETM) and government regulatory actions promote companies' green technology innovation (GTI), little research has considered whether such innovation is substantial. In this paper, we categorize companies' GTI strategies into substantial innovation and strategic innovation. Considering market powers, the heterogeneity of companies, and the mutual influence of governments and companies, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model that involves large and small companies and the government and conduct a simulation utilizing data on China's CETM. Our findings reveal that carbon trading prices, innovation subsidies, and the government's verification mechanism are the main factors that affect companies' choices regarding substantial innovation. However, the current carbon trading prices in China are relatively low, and companies are still likely to choose strategic innovation. Moreover, we find that when the substantial innovation of large companies exerts a greater impact on the product revenues of small companies, small companies are more inclined to choose substantial innovation. Therefore, in an effort to induce companies to choose substantial innovation, the CETM should play the leading role in this situation, and the government should implement different innovation subsidies and improve the verification mechanism.