内生性
意识形态
自愿披露
政治
样品(材料)
民主
业务
收益
会计
信息不对称
盈余管理
机构投资者
经济
政治学
计量经济学
财务
公司治理
法学
化学
色谱法
作者
Ahmed Elnahas,Lei Gao,Md Noman Hossain,Jeong‐Bon Kim
标识
DOI:10.1017/s0022109023001023
摘要
Abstract This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.
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