可扩展性
服务(商务)
激励
计算机科学
投资(军事)
业务
集合(抽象数据类型)
产业组织
营销
微观经济学
经济
数据库
政治学
政治
程序设计语言
法学
作者
Jin Li,Gary P. Pisano,Y. Xu,Feng Zhu
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2023-07-01
卷期号:69 (7): 3958-3975
被引量:7
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4522
摘要
The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform and its sellers’ capacities. In this study, we explore one strategy that a marketplace platform can use to enhance its scalability: providing an ancillary service to sellers. In our model, a platform can choose whether and when to provide this service to sellers and, if so, what prices to charge and which types of sellers to serve. Although such a service helps small sellers, we highlight that the provision of such a service can diminish the incentives of large sellers to make their own investment, thereby reducing their potential output. When the output reduction by large sellers is substantial, the platform may not want to provide the ancillary service, and, even if it does, it may choose to set a price higher than its marginal cost to motivate large sellers to scale. The platform may also choose to strategically delay the provision of the service. This paper was accepted by Hemant Bhargava, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4522 .
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