可再生能源
文件夹
产业组织
电
可再生能源组合标准
利润(经济学)
电力市场
业务
环境经济学
激励
电力零售
电力工业
微观经济学
义务
经济
上网电价
能源政策
财务
工程类
电气工程
法学
政治学
作者
Chaoping Zhu,Ruguo Fan,Jinchai Lin
出处
期刊:Energy Policy
[Elsevier]
日期:2019-11-06
卷期号:136: 111072-111072
被引量:94
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111072
摘要
The renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in China is to put into effect at the beginning of 2020, which will inevitably affect the strategy of stakeholders in retail electricity market. To study the effect of RPS on retail electricity market, we take the regulators (energy regulatory authorities) and two types of power sales companies with heterogeneous strength into consideration. Then a system dynamics model of tripartite evolutionary game is developed to analyze the strategy interaction of stakeholders and simulate the corresponding evolution process. Based on the background of Chinese renewable power industry, the scenario analysis method is employed to investigate the impacts of key parameters in relation with RPS scheme on stakeholders’ strategy selections. The results show that, to basically ensure all the power sales companies comply with quota obligation, TGC price of different stages should maintain at desired levels, net profit of renewable power sales should be no less than that of conventional power sales, and incentive and punishment should be within a reasonable range. In particular, the results reveal some policy effects such as reversal effect, blocking effect and over-reliance effect. More importantly, these results provide some policy recommendations for the rapid development of renewable power industry.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI