原设备制造商
再制造
业务
利润(经济学)
产业组织
重新使用
经济盈余
竞赛(生物学)
程式化事实
福利
商业
营销
经济
微观经济学
计算机科学
制造工程
工程类
市场经济
宏观经济学
操作系统
生物
废物管理
生态学
作者
Gökçe Esenduran,Eda Kemahlıoğlu‐Ziya,Jayashankar M. Swaminathan
摘要
As waste from used electronic products grows steadily, manufacturers face take‐back regulations mandating its collection and proper treatment through recycling, or remanufacturing. Environmentalists greet such regulation with enthusiasm, but its effect on remanufacturing activity and industry competition remains unclear. We research these questions, using a stylized model with an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) facing competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). We examine the effects of regulation on three key factors: remanufacturing levels, consumer surplus, and the OEM profit. First, we find that total OEM remanufacturing actually may decrease under high collection and/or reuse targets, meaning more stringent targets do not imply more remanufacturing. Consumer surplus and the OEM profit, meanwhile, may increase when OEM‐IR competition exists in a regulated market. Finally, through a numerical study, we investigate how total welfare changes in the collection target, what happens when the cost of collection is not linear, and what happens when IR products are valued differently by consumers.
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