关系契约
业务
价值(数学)
服务(商务)
关系视图
产业组织
纵向一体化
微观经济学
营销
经济
计算机科学
机器学习
作者
George P. Baker,Robert Gibbons,Kevin J. Murphy
标识
DOI:10.1162/003355302753399445
摘要
Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships—are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of management within and between firms.
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