激励
现金
不当行为
抵押品
自由裁量权
业务
利用
附带损害
法律与经济学
经济
财务
犯罪学
法学
政治学
计算机安全
心理学
计算机科学
微观经济学
作者
Aurélie Ouss,Megan T. Stevenson
出处
期刊:American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
[American Economic Association]
日期:2023-06-28
卷期号:15 (3): 150-182
被引量:8
摘要
Courts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations. (JEL K41, K42)
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