Promotions, Adverse Selection, and Efficiency

Previous articleNext article No AccessPromotions, Adverse Selection, and EfficiencyMichael Waldman and Zhenda YinMichael Waldman Search for more articles by this author and Zhenda Yin Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Labor Economics Just Accepted Published for the Society of Labor Economists, Economics Research Center/ NORC Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/726065 HistoryAccepted May 23, 2023 © 2023 The University of Chicago. All Rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.