报童模式
业务
产业组织
广告
经济
营销
环境经济学
计算机科学
供应链
作者
Gongbing Bi,Yinghui Liu,Pingfan Wang
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2024.2321609
摘要
This study examines the relationship between advertising and financing decisions in an online supply chain consisting of an e-platform and a capital-constrained retailer. The e-platform is the leader in a Stackelberg game, and the interaction is modelled in two advertising scenarios. The results indicate that advertising can reduce risk and is always beneficial, with an e-platform willing to support the retailer only when the former decides on the advertising level. When providing both advertising and financing services, the e-platform gains the ability to directly regulate the retailer's ordering decisions, thereby increasing its strategic flexibility.
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