反事实思维
反事实条件
集合(抽象数据类型)
心理信息
心理学
因果推理
认知心理学
事件(粒子物理)
因果模型
认知
归属
实证研究
社会心理学
认识论
计算机科学
政治学
数学
哲学
物理
量子力学
神经科学
程序设计语言
法学
梅德林
统计
作者
Tadeg Quillien,Christopher G. Lucas
摘要
Everything that happens has a multitude of causes, but people make causal judgments effortlessly. How do people select one particular cause (e.g., the lightning bolt that set the forest ablaze) out of the set of factors that contributed to the event (the oxygen in the air, the dry weather … )? Cognitive scientists have suggested that people make causal judgments about an event by simulating alternative ways things could have happened. We argue that this counterfactual theory explains many features of human causal intuitions, given two simple assumptions. First, people tend to imagine counterfactual possibilities that are both a priori likely and similar to what actually happened. Second, people judge that a factor C caused effect E if C and E are highly correlated across these counterfactual possibilities. In a reanalysis of existing empirical data, and a set of new experiments, we find that this theory uniquely accounts for people's causal intuitions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
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