The Streamer's sales strategy choice considering sales effort

Streamers play a key role in publicizing products and promoting sales, and live streaming has gradually become an important channel for firms seeking to sell products. Some highly influential streamers may choose whether and how to cooperate with firms. This study considers two sales strategies that streamers might choose: a non-selective sales (NS) strategy and a selective sales (S) strategy. Under the NS strategy, streamers always choose to sell firms' products, while under the S strategy, streamers only cooperate with firms whose products closely fit consumers' preference. Considering the streamer's sales effort during a live stream and two key characteristics—influence and product-matching reliability—this study employs a Stackelberg game model to investigate the streamer's sales strategy preference and the impact of the streamer's characteristics. The study also explores conflict between the firm and the streamer in selecting the sales strategy. Our mathematical analysis demonstrates that the streamer makes more sales effort to increase demand during the live stream under the NS strategy than under the S strategy. The streamer with high influence or high product-matching reliability should adopt the S strategy, whereas the streamer with less influence and product-matching reliability will likely prefer the NS strategy. We also identify two Pareto zones, showing that the streamer and firm prefer the same sales strategy (either NS or S) in some cases. These findings contribute to the literature on live-stream selling and provide practical implications for firm managers and streamers.