利比里亚元
质量(理念)
正面反馈
数据库事务
对比度(视觉)
互惠的
非正面反馈
交易成本
微观经济学
经济
行为经济学
计量经济学
计算机科学
营销
业务
工程类
哲学
物理
人工智能
电气工程
电压
认识论
程序设计语言
量子力学
语言学
财务
作者
Luı́s Cabral,Lingfang Li
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2015-09-01
卷期号:61 (9): 2052-2063
被引量:121
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2074
摘要
We run a series of controlled field experiments on eBay where buyers are rewarded for providing feedback. Our results provide little support for the hypothesis of buyers’ rational economic behavior: the likelihood of feedback barely increases as we increase feedback rebate values; also, the speed of feedback, bid levels, and the number of bids are all insensitive to rebate values. By contrast, we find evidence consistent with reciprocal buyer behavior. Lower transaction quality leads to a higher probability of negative feedback as well as a speeding up of such negative feedback. However, when transaction quality is low (as measured by slow shipping), offering a rebate significantly decreases the likelihood of negative feedback. All in all, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that buyers reciprocate the sellers’ “good deeds” (feedback rebate, high transaction quality) with more frequent and more favorable feedback. As a result, sellers can “buy” feedback, but such feedback is likely to be biased. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2074 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.
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