业务
产品(数学)
定价策略
价格歧视
营销
产业组织
广告
商业
几何学
数学
作者
Hsing Kenneth Cheng,Kyung Sung Jung,Young Kwark,Jingchuan Pu
出处
期刊:Information Systems Research
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2022-11-04
卷期号:34 (3): 1131-1147
被引量:16
标识
DOI:10.1287/isre.2022.1175
摘要
Sales on the e-commerce platform in the United States have experienced explosive growth and are projected to surpass $740 billion in 2023. The expansion of the platform’s traditional role as a reseller into an online marketplace and the introduction of its own brand products have stoked a huge fear among the incumbent sellers. The platform’s unfair anti-competitive practice further aggravates the situation. Consequently, politicians and regulators have proposed prohibiting platforms from introducing own brand products to protect the incumbent sellers. This study addresses two questions of critical interest to the policymakers and the incumbent sellers. First, how does the platform’s introducing its own brand product affect the incumbent sellers? Second, how effective is the proposed policy in terms of protecting the incumbent sellers? We examine the impact of the platform’s own brand introduction on the incumbent sellers under two prevailing sell-on and sell-to pricing contracts. We find that the proposed legislation “that prohibits platforms from both offering a marketplace for commerce and participating in that marketplace” does not have the desired outcome of helping the incumbent sellers. Instead, it forces the platform to adopt only the sell-to contract with its own brand introduction which hurts the sellers under most market conditions.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI