独立性(概率论)
膨胀(宇宙学)
经济
贫穷
中央银行
通货膨胀目标
调速器
货币政策
货币经济学
经济增长
理论物理学
数学
热力学
统计
物理
作者
Agyapomaa Gyeke-Dako,Elikplimi Komla Agbloyor,Abel Mawuko Agoba,Festus Ebo Turkson,Emmanuel Abbey
标识
DOI:10.1177/09726527221078434
摘要
This article discusses the extent to which central bank independence (CBI) can be used to mitigate the regressive nature of inflation. Using 44 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries from the period 1970–2012, the article first examines whether CBI has any influence on inflation by distinguishing between legal independence and governor turnover rates. The evidence shows that CBI helps control inflation, and that inflation generally reduces poverty, and this effect is even stronger, in an environment of low CBI. JEL Codes: E02, E58, E31, I32
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