股东
代理成本
透视图(图形)
中国
业务
样品(材料)
代理(哲学)
委托代理问题
经济
货币经济学
会计
公司治理
财务
计算机科学
哲学
化学
色谱法
认识论
人工智能
政治学
法学
作者
Bo Zhang,Heyu Geng,Ruixue Zhou,Limei Yang
标识
DOI:10.1080/00014788.2023.2266804
摘要
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2017, this study investigates the impact of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on cost stickiness from the agency costs perspective. We find a positive association between MLS and cost stickiness after controlling for various determinants of cost stickiness. The results of additional analyses suggest that coordination costs among large shareholders make it challenging to monitor managers, and stronger protection of minority shareholders helps to eliminate the effect of MLS on cost stickiness. This paper extends our understanding of the 'dark side' of MLS and complements existing research investigating the determinants of cost stickiness from the ownership structure perspective.
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