股东
调整大小
溢出效应
业务
投资(军事)
公司治理
货币经济学
经济
金融经济学
财务
政治学
宏观经济学
经济政策
法学
欧洲联盟
政治
作者
Mark R. DesJardine,Wei Shi,Cheng Yin
出处
期刊:Strategy science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2024-03-18
标识
DOI:10.1287/stsc.2022.0111
摘要
Existing research shows that shareholder pressures can shorten firms’ investment horizons. Yet studies have so far been limited to the actions shareholders take directly toward a focal firm. Considering that shareholder pressures may spill over between organizations, we argue that firms shorten their investment horizons following shareholder-initiated lawsuits against their peers in an effort to boost their short-run performance and preempt being sued themselves. We further posit that the negative relationship between this form of litigation threat and a firm’s investment horizon is weakened among firms with more long-term shareholders or future-focused CEOs, both of which guard against managers becoming overly short-term oriented. An examination of 18 years of shareholder litigation data supports our theory. This study highlights shareholder litigation as a distinct form of shareholder voice and one that is sufficiently potent to create spillover effects between firms.
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