困境
激励
补贴
房地产
政府(语言学)
业务
工作(物理)
晋升(国际象棋)
普通合伙企业
电动汽车
公私合营
环境经济学
财务
经济
工程类
微观经济学
法学
认识论
功率(物理)
哲学
物理
政治
机械工程
量子力学
语言学
市场经济
政治学
作者
Xingjun Huang,Yun Lin,Ming K. Lim,Fuli Zhou,Rui Ding,Zusheng Zhang
出处
期刊:Energy
[Elsevier]
日期:2021-10-12
卷期号:239: 122281-122281
被引量:44
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.energy.2021.122281
摘要
Low profit margins have become a significant barrier to investment in and the operation of electric vehicle-charging infrastructure, leading to an urgent need for new business models. Notwithstanding, nonmandatory policies and unclear responsibilities create a social dilemma in which it is difficult to promote charging facilities in urban residential areas. This study examines the feasibility of overcoming this dilemma by examining possible incentive mechanisms involving government, charging infrastructure operators, real estate agencies, and electric vehicle users. Leveraging evolutionary game theory, this study designs a theoretical model based on strategic interactions among different agents in promoting charging facilities in urban residential areas. Our results indicate that (1) the optimal scenario in one in which all participants work closely together to popularize charging facilities, and this scenario has theoretical possibilities in the real world; (2) government subsidies are necessary but not sufficient for promoting charging facilities in urban residential areas; (3) electric vehicle user participation in promotion is critical; and (4) the operation model in this study is more economically efficient than prevalent industrial operation models, and the role of real estate agencies cannot be ignored.
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