代理(哲学)
激励
委托代理问题
结构和代理
转让定价
公共关系
概念框架
业务
政治学
管理科学
知识管理
管理
社会学
经济
计算机科学
微观经济学
社会科学
法学
公司治理
跨国公司
作者
John W. Pratt,Richard Zeckhauser
摘要
Eight essays address the inherent problems of the agency relationship, such as monitoring performance and the careful design of incentives. By applying agency theory to actual practices in areas as diverse as tax-sheltered programs and transfer pricing, the contributors present conceptual tools and practical ideas for shaping agency structures to serve the best interests of both parties. A research colloquium book.
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