A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design

共谋 激励相容性 计算机科学 维克瑞-克拉克-格罗夫斯拍卖行 共同价值拍卖 机构设计 微观经济学 英国拍卖 维克里拍卖 数理经济学 人气 拍卖理论 估价(财务) 独特竞价拍卖 组合拍卖 收入 背景(考古学) 激励 经济 生物 会计 财务 社会心理学 古生物学 心理学
作者
Jason Milionis,Dean Hirsch,Andy Arditi,Pranav Garimidi
标识
DOI:10.1145/3560832.3563436
摘要

Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT auctioning procedures are conducted in various, ad hoc ways, while mostly ignoring the context that the blockchain provides. One of the main targets of this work is to shed light on the vastly unexplored design space of NFT Auction Mechanisms, especially in those characteristics that fundamentally differ from traditional and more contemporaneous forms of auctions. We focus on the case that bidders have a valuation for the auctioned NFT, i.e., what we term the single-item NFT auction case. In this setting, we formally define an NFT Auction Mechanism, give the properties that we would ideally like a perfect mechanism to satisfy (broadly known as incentive compatibility and collusion resistance) and prove that it is impossible to have such a perfect mechanism. Even though we cannot have an all-powerful protocol like that, we move on to consider relaxed notions of those properties that we may desire the protocol to satisfy, as a trade-off between implementability and economic guarantees. Specifically, we define the notion of an equilibrium-truthful auction, where neither the seller nor the bidders can improve their utility by acting non-truthfully, so long as the counter-party acts truthfully. We also define asymptotically second-price auctions, in which the seller does not lose asymptotically any revenue in comparison to the theoretically-optimal (static) second-price sealed-bid auction, in the case that the bidders' valuations are drawn independently from some distribution. We showcase why these two are very desirable properties for an auction mechanism to enjoy, and construct the first known NFT Auction Mechanism which provably possesses such formal guarantees.
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