A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design

共谋 激励相容性 计算机科学 维克瑞-克拉克-格罗夫斯拍卖行 共同价值拍卖 机构设计 微观经济学 英国拍卖 维克里拍卖 数理经济学 人气 拍卖理论 估价(财务) 独特竞价拍卖 组合拍卖 收入 背景(考古学) 激励 经济 生物 会计 财务 社会心理学 古生物学 心理学
作者
Jason Milionis,Dean Hirsch,Andy Arditi,Pranav Garimidi
标识
DOI:10.1145/3560832.3563436
摘要

Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT auctioning procedures are conducted in various, ad hoc ways, while mostly ignoring the context that the blockchain provides. One of the main targets of this work is to shed light on the vastly unexplored design space of NFT Auction Mechanisms, especially in those characteristics that fundamentally differ from traditional and more contemporaneous forms of auctions. We focus on the case that bidders have a valuation for the auctioned NFT, i.e., what we term the single-item NFT auction case. In this setting, we formally define an NFT Auction Mechanism, give the properties that we would ideally like a perfect mechanism to satisfy (broadly known as incentive compatibility and collusion resistance) and prove that it is impossible to have such a perfect mechanism. Even though we cannot have an all-powerful protocol like that, we move on to consider relaxed notions of those properties that we may desire the protocol to satisfy, as a trade-off between implementability and economic guarantees. Specifically, we define the notion of an equilibrium-truthful auction, where neither the seller nor the bidders can improve their utility by acting non-truthfully, so long as the counter-party acts truthfully. We also define asymptotically second-price auctions, in which the seller does not lose asymptotically any revenue in comparison to the theoretically-optimal (static) second-price sealed-bid auction, in the case that the bidders' valuations are drawn independently from some distribution. We showcase why these two are very desirable properties for an auction mechanism to enjoy, and construct the first known NFT Auction Mechanism which provably possesses such formal guarantees.
最长约 10秒,即可获得该文献文件

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
更新
PDF的下载单位、IP信息已删除 (2025-6-4)

科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
天天快乐应助leotao采纳,获得10
刚刚
格林渥完成签到,获得积分20
2秒前
3秒前
6秒前
善学以致用应助Kelsey采纳,获得10
7秒前
桐桐应助迟迟采纳,获得10
9秒前
陈博士完成签到,获得积分10
10秒前
脑洞疼应助最牛的kangkang采纳,获得10
11秒前
lbb黎完成签到,获得积分10
11秒前
123发布了新的文献求助10
11秒前
12秒前
hx完成签到 ,获得积分10
12秒前
牧紊完成签到 ,获得积分10
13秒前
13秒前
陈博士发布了新的文献求助10
14秒前
15秒前
18秒前
123完成签到,获得积分10
19秒前
吃饭饭完成签到,获得积分20
20秒前
20秒前
123完成签到,获得积分10
20秒前
wanci应助hhh采纳,获得10
20秒前
Hello应助欣慰的乌冬面采纳,获得10
21秒前
21秒前
22秒前
22秒前
柯一一应助西米采纳,获得10
22秒前
23秒前
24秒前
CipherSage应助笔墨留香采纳,获得10
24秒前
爱u发布了新的文献求助10
25秒前
迟迟发布了新的文献求助10
26秒前
金山完成签到,获得积分10
28秒前
细雨发布了新的文献求助10
28秒前
wtt发布了新的文献求助10
28秒前
29秒前
30秒前
30秒前
形容完成签到,获得积分10
31秒前
32秒前
高分求助中
A new approach to the extrapolation of accelerated life test data 1000
Picture Books with Same-sex Parented Families: Unintentional Censorship 700
ACSM’s Guidelines for Exercise Testing and Prescription, 12th edition 500
Nucleophilic substitution in azasydnone-modified dinitroanisoles 500
不知道标题是什么 500
Indomethacinのヒトにおける経皮吸収 400
Phylogenetic study of the order Polydesmida (Myriapoda: Diplopoda) 370
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 工程类 有机化学 生物化学 物理 内科学 纳米技术 计算机科学 化学工程 复合材料 遗传学 基因 物理化学 催化作用 冶金 细胞生物学 免疫学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 3975658
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 3519986
关于积分的说明 11200481
捐赠科研通 3256410
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 1798247
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 877490
科研通“疑难数据库(出版商)”最低求助积分说明 806376