高管薪酬
公司治理
补偿(心理学)
业务
股东
情感(语言学)
议价能力
投资(军事)
价值(数学)
公司名称
会计
激励
功率(物理)
经济
财务
微观经济学
法学
政治
机器学习
哲学
物理
量子力学
语言学
计算机科学
政治学
心理学
精神分析
作者
Tobias Bornemann,Martin Jacob,Mariana Sailer
出处
期刊:The Accounting Review
[American Accounting Association]
日期:2022-07-07
卷期号:98 (2): 31-58
被引量:10
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2019-0567
摘要
ABSTRACT The limitation of executive compensation has been a matter of public and policy debate for at least 20 years. We examine a regulatory action in Austria in 2014 where the tax deductibility of the total value of executive compensation is unavoidably limited. We find no average effects on the growth or composition of executives’ pay. However, the deductibility limit affects the managers of firms with low bargaining power and of firms with strong corporate governance, indicating that they are affected by the deductibility limit. Additionally, the contract durations for executives decrease after renegotiation. We further find that affected firms experience cuts in investment and research and development, suggesting that shareholders bear part of the economic burden. Our results indicate that the effectiveness of other reforms, such as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, in restricting executive pay is rather limited. JEL Classifications: H21; H22; M41.
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