机会主义
业务
公司治理
供应链
交易成本
产业组织
财务
数据库事务
经济
营销
市场经济
计算机科学
程序设计语言
作者
Qiang Lu,Beini Liu,Kangkang Yu
标识
DOI:10.1080/13675567.2021.1897090
摘要
This study aims to explore the influence of supplier-buyer cooperation (contract governance and relationship governance) on supply chain financing availability from the bilateral perspective of small and medium-sized enterprises and their suppliers (or buyers) based on the transaction cost theory. A total of 248 valid paired questionnaires were received from small and medium enterprises and their suppliers (or buyers). Multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses. The results show that: (1) contract governance is more effective than relationship governance on supply chain financing availability, and the two forms of governance have a positive interaction effect. (2) Opportunism plays a mediating role between supplier-buyer cooperation and supply chain financing availability. Contract governance improves supply chain financing availability more strongly than relationship governance, by reducing supply chain financing risks. (3) Financing alignment has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between opportunism and supply chain financing availability.
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