夏普里值
公理
计算机科学
合作博弈论
理性
Choquet积分
模糊逻辑
价值(数学)
操作员(生物学)
数理经济学
分布(数学)
资源(消歧)
机制(生物学)
博弈论
运筹学
数学
人工智能
机器学习
哲学
数学分析
抑制因子
认识论
基因
化学
转录因子
法学
生物化学
计算机网络
政治学
几何学
出处
期刊:Communications in computer and information science
日期:2019-01-01
卷期号:: 85-104
标识
DOI:10.1007/978-981-15-0657-4_6
摘要
The formation of the technology innovation coalition of the construction industry can give full play to the resource advantages of all participants, innovate technologies, save cost, improve construction quality, and achieve a multi-win situation. The key to the success of the coalition is to establish a fair and efficient mechanism of benefit distribution. Firstly, the forming mechanism and value creation mechanism is analyzed. Then the benefit distribution under the condition that members have certain degree of participation and certain degree of non-participation in the coalition is discussed, assuming that the members are fully aware of the expected benefit of different cooperation strategies before the cooperation. The essence is to solve cooperative game with intuitionistic fuzzy coalition. In this paper, Shapley value for intuitionistic fuzzy cooperative game is proposed by taking use of intuitionistic fuzzy set theory, Choquet integrals and continuous ordered weighted average operator. It’s also proofed that the defined Shapley value satisfies three axioms. Finally, the effectiveness and rationality of Shapley is illustrated by a numerical example.
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