Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered the global energy crisis and been one wrench in global energy markets. A surge in global energy prices is sent inflation soaring worldwide. Where are global energy markets heading? To address the wrench, we construct a tripartite energy evolutionary game including Russia, Part A countries (mainly those imposing sanctions on Russia), and Part B countries (mainly those not imposing sanctions on Russia) to depict the international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The results show that: (i) Part A countries' optimal economic strategy can not affect the Russian and Part B countries' strategies, and they choose to import Russian energy; (ii) All participants' strategies converge to stable states, and Russia's strategy converges faster; (iii) Russian and Part B countries' strategies are more stable than Part A countries'; (iv) Installing price caps will aggravate Part A countries' energy crises. A diplomatic effort is the best way for all participants to avert an escalation of the energy crisis.