激励
晋升(国际象棋)
偏爱
政府(语言学)
约束(计算机辅助设计)
财务
经济
业务
公共经济学
微观经济学
政治学
工程类
机械工程
语言学
哲学
政治
法学
作者
Hao Li,Zhaohua Wang,Bin Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.enbuild.2022.112167
摘要
In the promotion of the zero carbon building (ZCB), financial incentives are essential measures. However, the flaws of financial incentives are often overlooked. This paper constructs a three-subject evolutionary game model of the ZCB market to analyze the invalidation, damage, and perfection of financial incentives. By analysing the interactions and decisions among governments, developers and consumers in the ZCB market, a policy flaw is raised—financial incentives cannot be effective when developers’ or consumers’ preference for ZCB is below a certain threshold (with a corresponding calculation formula). The paper also finds that the government's response to failure by increasing financial incentives has had little effect. A reasonable response could be to break the threshold constraint through non-economic means such as low carbon promotion. A policy simulation based on US national case is provided along with theoretical results to explain their practical use and offer a better understanding of their implications. Through theoretical analysis and case simulation, the unique findings obtained in this paper provide effective support for designing and improving ZCB incentives, helping to drive climate-neutral global building stock.
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