Battery recycling Models Selection and Contractual Incentives: from an Information Sharing Perspective

As the battery recycling market in China is still in its early stages of development, the mechanisms, channels, pricing, and efficiency of battery recycling are shrouded in opacity. Battery recycling in China is currently dominated by electric vehicle manufacturer, supplemented by other market players such as battery producers and electric vehicle retailers. Due to the lack of information, battery recycling lacks cooperation and communication, and the whole market is dealing with "Information Island." Therefore, based on information sharing and channel competition, this paper designs a Stackelberg game model with an electric vehicle manufacturer, an electric vehicle retailer, and a third-party recycler as the primary participants. This paper finds effective information sharing can reduce intensified market competition and promote the transformation of market players into "collaboration state". To promote partnership in the battery recycling market, this paper proposes a revenue-sharing contract incentive for the electric vehicle retailer to share demand information about battery recycling. This paper finds a revenue-sharing contract based on information sharing can help companies and competitors make appropriate behavioral choices in the battery recycling market. This study demonstrates that information sharing benefits the electric vehicle manufacturer and the third-party recycler while offering no advantages to the electric vehicle retailer. The decreasing accuracy of demand signals results in the diminishing value of information sharing for the electric vehicle manufacturer and the third-party recycler. The revenue-sharing contract can incentivize the electric vehicle retailer to share information to a certain extent.