Strategic Behaviors of Renewable Energy Generation Companies Participating in the Electricity and Carbon Coupled Markets Based on Non-Cooperative Game Theory

可再生能源 环境经济学 发电 博弈论 业务 产业组织 自然资源经济学 微观经济学 经济 工程类 功率(物理) 电气工程 物理 量子力学
作者
Peng Wang,Zixuan Guo,Shengyu Zhang,Lin Zhu,Liqi Yi,Xiaohua Song
标识
DOI:10.2139/ssrn.4735530
摘要

Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add Paper to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely Copy URL Strategic Behaviors of Renewable Energy Generation Companies Participating in the Electricity and Carbon Coupled Markets Based on Non-Cooperative Game Theory 32 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2024 See all articles by Peng WangPeng WangNorth China Electric Power UniversityZixuan Guoaffiliation not provided to SSRNShengyu Zhangaffiliation not provided to SSRNLin Zhuaffiliation not provided to SSRNLiqi YiNorth China Electric Power UniversityXiaohua SongNorth China Electric Power University Abstract Renewable energy (RE) in China can participate in electricity and carbon market trading, which can help recover the investment of RE. Thus, we propose a coupled market equilibrium model for non-cooperative game interactions among power generation companies (GenCos), considering the electricity and carbon markets. The proposed model is a bi-level model. The upper-level model considers non-cooperative game behavior driven by maximizing profits for GenCos. The lower-level model includes two stages of the electricity market: the day-ahead market and the real-time market; it implements joint clearing of energy and reserves, and continuous trading with competitive auctions in the carbon market based on the clearing results of the electricity market. Simulations are performed based on the actual data of the power system in a certain region of Guangdong Province, China. The results show that coupled electricity and carbon markets can effectively reduce market costs and carbon emissions, improve the society welfare and RE benefits. The uncertain increase in RE output and higher installed capacity reduce the total revenue of the RE in the coupled markets. The initial carbon quota decomposition optimization decision of the coal-fired GenCo and gradual reduction in the initial carbon quota will gradually increase the revenue of the RE. Keywords: Renewable energy generation company, electricity market, Carbon market, Non cooperative game, Strategic Behaviors Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation Wang, Peng and Guo, Zixuan and Zhang, Shengyu and Zhu, Lin and Yi, Liqi and Song, Xiaohua, Strategic Behaviors of Renewable Energy Generation Companies Participating in the Electricity and Carbon Coupled Markets Based on Non-Cooperative Game Theory. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4735530 Peng Wang (Contact Author) North China Electric Power University ( email ) School of Business Administration,NCEPUNo. 2 Beinong Road, Changqing DistrictBeijing, 102206China Zixuan Guo affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email ) No Address Available Shengyu Zhang affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email ) No Address Available Lin Zhu affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email ) No Address Available Liqi Yi North China Electric Power University ( email ) School of Business Administration,NCEPUNo. 2 Beinong Road, Changqing DistrictBeijing, 102206China Xiaohua Song North China Electric Power University ( email ) School of Business Administration,NCEPUNo. 2 Beinong Road, Changqing DistrictBeijing, 102206China Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share? Submit Negative Results Paper statistics Downloads 0 Abstract Views 9 41 References PlumX Metrics Related eJournals Energy Policy & Economics eJournal Follow Energy Policy & Economics eJournal Subscribe to this fee journal for more curated articles on this topic FOLLOWERS 158 PAPERS 10,269 Bioenergy & Other Renewable Energy eJournal Follow Bioenergy & Other Renewable Energy eJournal Subscribe to this fee journal for more curated articles on this topic FOLLOWERS 122 PAPERS 2,305 Feedback Feedback to SSRN Feedback (required) Email (required) Submit If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.

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