期刊:British Academy eBooks [British Academy] 日期:2006-09-07被引量:167
标识
DOI:10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0005
摘要
Transparency is widely supposed to make institutions and their officeholders both more trustworthy and more trusted. Yet in the United Kingdom many institutions and office-holders on whom transparency requirements have been imposed across the last fifteen years are now seen as less trustworthy, and are apparently less trusted than they were before the requirements were introduced. Does this suggest that transparency does not improve trustworthiness? Or that it increases trustworthiness without increasing trust? Or is the supposed evidence for declining trustworthiness and declining trust misleading? How confident can we be that transparency supports either trustworthiness or trust? Government, corporations, and their critics seemingly converge in seeing transparency as indispensable for accountability and good governance, for preventing corruption and improving performance, and for increasing trustworthiness and trust. But does transparency have these desirable effects? Transparency requirements may fail to improve either trustworthiness or trust because they set a one-sided standard for public, corporate, or other communication. Although transparency demands too little for effective communication, it is an effective antidote to secrecy.