强化学习
斯塔克伯格竞赛
随机博弈
计算机科学
动态定价
博弈论
纳什均衡
电
电力市场
电价
进化博弈论
需求响应
复制因子方程
数学优化
微观经济学
人工智能
经济
工程类
人口
人口学
数学
社会学
电气工程
作者
Wen Chen,Jing Qiu,Junhua Zhao,Qingmian Chai,Zhao Yang Dong
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2022-06-22
卷期号:14 (1): 424-439
被引量:22
标识
DOI:10.1109/tsg.2022.3185138
摘要
In the transition to a two-sided electricity market, energy users are turning into prosumers who own the flexible distributed energy resources (DERs) and have the potential to provide services to the power system. Virtual power plants (VPPs) aggregate DERs to join the electricity market and respond to system signals. It is urgent to develop a new pricing mechanism for VPPs to allocate the payoff from the electricity market to prosumers. This paper proposes a customized rebate package pricing mechanism for a VPP retailer to reward prosumers for supporting the power system. The retailer’s pricing strategies are determined based on a Stackelberg game, considering the heterogeneous prosumers’ dynamic selecting process based on an evolutionary game. The extended replicator dynamics is proposed to take the future payoff into account and guarantee the evolutionary equilibrium. Moreover, a new reinforcement learning algorithm based on the Cross learning model is developed to solve the evolutionary game with less computational effort. The simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed customized rebate package pricing mechanism, which can efficiently reward prosumers’ flexible resources in supporting the system while maximizing the retailer’s utility to achieve a win-win outcome.
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