业务
利润(经济学)
采购
供应链
产业组织
下游(制造业)
微观经济学
结果(博弈论)
供应商关系管理
竞赛(生物学)
订单(交换)
上游(联网)
供应链管理
营销
经济
计算机科学
生态学
计算机网络
财务
生物
作者
Zhibin Yang,Xinxin Hu,Haresh Gurnani,Huiqi Guan
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2017-04-19
卷期号:64 (5): 2199-2218
被引量:90
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2702
摘要
We study the optimal distribution strategy of a supplier with limited capacity. The supplier may adopt the supplier-only role, be the solo seller in the market, or use the dual-channel strategy and compete with its downstream buyer. In comparison to the case of unlimited capacity, we show that the supplier, the buyer, and consumers may all benefit from the supplier’s limited capacity at the same time, leading to a “win-win-win” outcome. We also find that, under limited capacity, the downstream buyer may order the supplier’s entire capacity and strategically withhold some supply from being sold to the market even if there is no underlying supply-side or demand-side uncertainty. Our result points to a new form of strategic purchasing behavior by the buyer in the face of upstream and downstream competition. Interestingly, we show that while buyer withholding is always beneficial for the supplier, it can reduce the buyer’s profit under certain cases, although total supply chain profit is the first-best outcome. Also, counter to conventional antitrust concerns, buyer withholding at times may benefit consumers in spite of reduced downstream competition. Finally, in contrast to intuition, we find that the supplier’s benefit from investing in direct selling capability is highest when its capacity size is moderate and not large. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2702 . This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.
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