绿色洗涤
审计
多样性(控制论)
业务
公开披露
经验证据
环境政策
会计
环境审计
公共经济学
经济
环境资源管理
企业社会责任
公共关系
机械工程
哲学
认识论
人工智能
政治学
计算机科学
工程类
作者
Thomas P. Lyon,John W. Maxwell
标识
DOI:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00282.x
摘要
We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and an activist may audit and penalize the firm for disclosing positive but not negative aspects of its environmental profile. We fully characterize the model's equilibria, and derive a variety of predictions about disclosure behavior. We rationalize conflicting results in the empirical literature, finding a nonmonotonic relationship between a firm's expected environmental performance and its environmental disclosures. Greater activist pressure deters greenwash, but induces some firms to disclose less about their environmental performance. Environmental management systems discourage firms with poor expected environmental performance from greenwashing, which may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt them.
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