中立
法律与经济学
相关性(法律)
法学
显著性(神经科学)
1998年数据保护法
立法
义务
持续性
计算机的法律问题
业务
政治学
计算机科学
社会学
生态学
互联网
人工智能
万维网
生物
作者
Mireille Hildebrandt,Laura Tielemans
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.clsr.2013.07.004
摘要
This article argues that to achieve a technology neutral law, technology specific law is sometimes required. To explain this we discriminate between three objectives, often implied in the literature on technological neutrality of law. The first we call the compensation objective, which refers to the need to have technology specific law in place whenever specific technological designs threated the substance of human rights. The second we call the innovation objective, referring to the need to prevent legal rules from privileging or discriminating specific technological designs in ways that would stifle innovation. The third we call the sustainability objective, which refers to the need to enact legislation at the right level of abstraction, to prevent the law from becoming out of date all too soon. The argument that technology neutral law requires compensation in the form of technology specific law is built on a relational conception of technology, and we explain that though technology in itself is neither good nor bad, it is never neutral. We illustrate the relevance of the three objectives with a discussion of the EU cookie Directive of 2009. Finally we explain the salience of the legal obligation of Data Protection by Design in the proposed General Data Protection Regulation and test this against the compensation, innovation and sustainability objectives.
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