A tripartite evolutionary game study of low-carbon innovation system from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes

Traditional manufacturing industry is in the early stages of transition to low-carbon innovative production, and is in urgent need of a low-carbon innovation system to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. In order to realize the effective supervision of enterprise carbon emissions, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the corporate, government and public from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes. The main results are as follows. First, the increase in government subsidies to a certain extent will help encourage companies to choose low-carbon innovative production strategies, but more subsidies are not always better. Excessive subsidies will increase the cost of government regulation and reduce the probability of government regulation. Second, the tripartite evolutionary game system does not converge under the static subsidies and taxes mechanism. But the system could quickly converges to the stable condition under dynamic subsidies and taxes. The stable point is the situation of corporate low-carbon innovation, government regulation, and public supervision. Third, the public intervention and supervision can effectively prevent the phenomenon of government misconduct and enterprises over-emission production. And the influence of public reward and punishment is more effective for the government than for enterprises.