供应链
代理(哲学)
业务
利润(经济学)
产品(数学)
营销
模式(计算机接口)
企业社会责任
委托代理问题
代理成本
产业组织
商业
微观经济学
经济
财务
公共关系
公司治理
哲学
几何学
数学
认识论
计算机科学
政治学
股东
操作系统
作者
Wei Lin,Shengming Zheng,Shaofu Du,Baofeng Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2024.07.034
摘要
Cause marketing (CM) is commonly adopted to pursue profit growth or/and achieve corporate social responsibility (CSR). In online retailing, to facilitate CM for the products, e-retailers are increasingly implementing CM programs for the firms that sell products directly to consumers, i.e., suppliers under agency selling mode or themselves under reselling mode. Motivated by this, we examine how CM for the product influences the equilibrium outcomes under the two selling modes and the selling mode preferences of the supply chain members. Our results suggest that CM for the product is beneficial to both the supply chain members but can render the e-retailer to be hurt by a higher agency fee. Significantly, the supplier can prefer agency selling mode only when the agency fee is lower, whereas the e-retailer can prefer it even if the agency fee is lower. As a result of the changes in the selling mode preferences, the CM program can hurt the e-retailer when the selling mode is determined by the supplier. We further consider the cases where either of the supply chain members cares about CSR and fulfills it with CM. The results indicate that the concern for CSR of either of the supply chain members can coordinate their selling mode preferences. Specifically, the concern for CSR of the supplier (e-retailer) can induce them to prefer agency selling mode (reselling mode), thereby eliminating (further exacerbating) the adverse impact of the CM program on the supply chain members.
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