中国
晋升(国际象棋)
国有
经济
国家(计算机科学)
金融经济学
会计
业务
市场经济
政治学
法学
计算机科学
算法
政治
作者
Xin Wang,Tingting Zhao,Yue Sun,Dan Yang
标识
DOI:10.1080/00036846.2024.2412257
摘要
This paper considers firms' artificial intelligence (AI)-related discretionary disclosure to examine whether symbolic communications of AI influences a CEO's chance of career advancement in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find a positive relationship between symbolic AI disclosure and the possibility of managers getting promoted. Our main finding is more salient when a firm's achievement of policy goals is more crucial, its financial performance is relatively poor, and a manager has more urgent promotion needs. Results imply that CEOs engage in impression management via managerial discretionary disclosure to strengthen organizational legitimacy and build a favourable impression, which may increase their probability of getting promoted.
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